While the security condition in Afghanistan is getting worse, some officials in NATO and the UN have said that military means is not going to work to deal with the challenge, and there should be a negotiation with the insurgents. In the last three weeks, news about negotiation between the Afghan government and the Taliban has been circulating in the international and local media. Saudi Arabia is reported to have been mediating the talks. However, the peace talks are reported to be directed towards primarily securing Pakistan against Islamic militancy, by moving the Taliban into the Afghan political process rather than providing a thorough resolution to the problem in Afghanistan. The security situation in Pakistan has certainly affected the region and any resolution to securing Pakistan seems to be a legitimate effort by international actors. However, the concern on the Afghan side remains as to at what cost to Afghanistan should this happen, and is the resolution really aimed at stabilizing Afghanistan or is it proposed to bring back Pakistani control over the Islamic militant organizations?
Islamic militancy that enjoyed a great deal of support in Pakistan has now turned to a serious threat to the country itself. Attack on the Marriott Hotel in Islamabad was just one sign of a growing instability that has seriously worried Pakistan and its important international allies. Pakistan is at war with the Taliban in Swat and Bajaur and this, according to some Pakistani politicians should not have happened. The Sydney Morning Herald quoted Tariq Azim a former minister in the government of Pervez Musharraf saying “The majority of the people of Pakistan do not see it as our war. We are fighting for somebody else and we are suffering because of that.”[1] The former Pakistani Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif who reportedly had been present at the Taliban –Afghan government Mecca meeting in September has called on the Pakistani government to stop fighting against, and talk with militants with no any precondition. The situation in Pakistan has worried many observers. “A leaked US top-secret National Intelligence Estimate on Pakistan concludes that the country is "on the edge”[2].
The situation in Pakistan has caused Pakistan’s allies –important among them Britain, the US and Saudi Arabia- to think of a resolution to get Pakistan away from the current wave of instability. Apparently, these efforts have materialized in terms of a peace talk initiative between the Afghan government and the Taliban insurgents. The idea behind is to satisfy indigenous Islamic militants’ demands by entering the Taliban into the political process in Afghanistan, and “entice the Taliban away from hard-line elements wedded to the alliance with al Qaeda.”[3]
A diplomat involved in the Afghan government-Taliban talk in Mecca expressed that the concern is Pakistan. Reuters quoted the diplomat saying that “They want to help because Pakistan is frightening. They fear what could happen in Pakistan. This (mediation) is to stabilize Pakistan,"[4] Reuters also reported that top Saudi intelligence officials had worked on the plan to mediate the so called Iftar meeting between the Afghan government representatives and the Taliban already for sometimes till the actual meeting took place in September.
Saudi Arabia has great interest in Pakistan as its close ally in the region, and has been backing the country for a long time to keep its interest by empowering and influencing Sunni Islamic groups in the region, especially in Afghanistan. Now that Pakistan is destabilizing, Saudi Arabia is worried about the consequences of the instability, especially about Bin Ladan's Al-Qaeda –an enemy of the Saudi royal monarchy- taking over the insurgency leadership in the region.
Britain, a historic ally of Pakistan seems to have been working on a plan for Pakistan by taking controversial counterinsurgency policy in Afghanistan. It seems that Britain had noticed the threat in Pakistan earlier than any other of its allies, and started to work closely with some factions of the Taliban despite being at war with them. Tensions emerged between the Afghan government and the British over the latter’s suspicious activities. The Afghan government expelled two high ranking British nationals from Afghanistan, one of them a top British diplomat, in the beginning of 2008. British officers have had a central role in forming a perception of the Taliban insurgents as taking over Afghanistan, and doing so, they have mobilized support for the recognition of Taliban and their incorporation into the government structure in Afghanistan.
The efforts of Pakistan and its allies to bring back Taliban into the power structure in Afghanistan as a strategy to secure Pakistan is now supported by Afghans as well, who in hope of achieving peace, think that the initiative is primarily serving their interest. No doubt that the peace is in the ultimate interest of the Afghans. However, the cost of this deal to the Afghans does not seem to be estimated.
The Pakistani-Saudi-British peace initiative will not be clear of negative security and political implications for Afghanistan. The prospect for stability in Afghanistan seems gloomier from a perspective on regional powers entering Afghanistan along with recognition of Taliban – if it is going to happen, of course. The Britain-Pakistan-Saudi support of the Taliban would drive Iran and India more intensively into the great game and this will ultimately take away central government’s control over the political process in Afghanistan. This would mark a return to a new phase of instability in the country. Iranian Foreign Minister has warned about the consequences of negotiation with Taliban.[5]
If a peace deal does not take Afghanistan as the ultimate priority, and if it is not aimed at securing a democratic Afghanistan, it will not only fail but would initiate another round of instability in the country. We shall not rush for a deal under the current frustration. The Afghan government should take strong side and play a central role in mapping the peace talks as to secure a post-Taliban democratic Afghanistan and prevent regional and international powers from pursuing their interests at the Afghan cost.
While a peace negotiation with Taliban is broadly encouraged in international and local level, the Saudi peace initiative seems to have targets other than primarily securing Afghanistan. Both, Saudi and Britain alongside with the US have vast interest in Pakistan. Although a secure Pakistan is always in the interest of Afghanistan, the Afghan government should make sure that one country’s security is not being built on the cost of another. The peace talk initiative demands deeper analysis and broader evaluation that requires cautious decision making by the Afghan side.
[1] The Sydney Morning Herald, War on Taliban losing support in Pakistan, Oct. 17 2008
[2] Ibid.
[3] Reuters, Andrew Hammond (RIYADH ) Saudi Arabia hosts Taliban talks to bolster , Oct. 15 2008
[4] Ibid.
[5] BBC Persian, Oct. 20 2008, http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/afghanistan/story/2008/10/081020_wkf-mottaki-taliban.shtml
Monday, October 20, 2008
Insergents, and the Prospect for Peace Talks
Pajhwok news agency has reported that Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the leader of Hizb-e-Islami has claimed the ambush on French soldiers in Sorubi, East of Kabul. According to AFP report, Hekmatyar has made the claim in a video delivered to Pajhwok Agency office in Peshawar. In the Sorubi ambush in 19the August, 10 French soldiers were killed and 21 wounded. This was called the ‘deadliest incident for the French army in 25 years’. The Taliban had claimed the ambush immediately after the battle, but now Hekmatyar has announced that he is responsible for it. Despite declaring Jihad against the foreign troops in Afghanistan back in 2002 Hekmatyar had not personally been taking responsibility for attacks on the Afghan government or international forces in a video record –a typical use of media for Al-Qaeda leaders- in the past.
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who is the former prime minister to the Islamic State of Afghanistan, and who played a strong role in Jihad against the Soviet Union, joined the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in 2002 after having been fully excluded from the post-Taliban government structure designed at the Bonn conference. Although some believe that Hekmatyar’s insurgents are among the Taliban and have a big role in the insurgency, especially in the areas closer to the capital he seems to have a complicated relation with Taliban. It has not been clear if his men are incorporated into the insurgency movement or are a separate body within it. His recent move to deny the Taliban’s hand in the killing of French soldiers and take its responsibility himself confirms that he preserves his own independent position within the insurgency structure.
Hekmatyar takes responsibility for the attack while the Afghan government is trying to launch a peace negotiation with insurgents through Saudi Arabia’s mediation. The government has been repeatedly asking Hekmatyar and Mullah Omar to put down their arms and join the peace and political process, despite the fact that they are on the CIA black list. But they both have rejected the proposal. Recent reports say that there have been covert talks with Taliban for the past some months, but neither Afghan officials nor the Taliban has admitted it. On 29th of September, Reuters reported that ‘The Taliban leadership on Monday denied a report they were negotiating with the Afghan government to end the war and the insurgents repeated their pledge to keep fighting till foreign troops were expelled from the country’.
Hekmatyar’s act of taking responsibility for attack on French soldiers can be interpreted as re-stating his commitment to the same objective shared by Mullah Omar. Hekmatyar and Mullah Omar’s rejection of peace talks implies that negotiation –though should be encouraged- will not immediately lead to a resolution or significant security improvement in Afghanistan. In order to get a deeper sense of the insurgency and its character we should look at the insurgency in a nuanced way in the sense to see it as comprised of different groups and its structure as fragmented and largely decentralized that is not bound together by a single central authority. In such cases, bringing a leader into the peace process might have very little effect on brining down the insurgency machine.
This situation is presumably realized by insurgency leaders too. It puts the leaders in a position that would make it hard for them to convince sub-insurgent networks in case of negotiation. the insurgents have proved to be tough on leaders who give up their resistance and join the enemy. They have killed many prominent religious authorities who cooperated with the government, and have not followed some senior Taliban authorities who joined the peace process. For some groups within the insurgents accepting peace proposals from a western backed government, which has no legitimacy for them, is almost equal to compromising their faith and ideological commitments. The major challenge in this regard has been that the groups under Mullah Omar and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s leadership have opposed the very legitimacy of an Afghan government. From this position, they have challenged any authority within their groups or outside who have tried to show that there is no problem with the government from the view point of religion.
Last week, President Karzai said to AFP that he had asked Saudi Arabia’s king as the leader of the Muslim world to mediate a peace talk with insurgents in Afghanistan. The success of this initiative seems to be very unlikely too. This is partly due to the decentralized structure of Islam as a social and political system that allows for fragmentation in it in terms of authority. But in regard to militant Islamic groups in particular, this kind of mediation is very unlikely to work out as the insurgents have never come under a central authority like Saudi Arabia’s king. Further, Islamic militants’ perception of Saudi’s king as an ally of the western countries, who has no authority before them, makes the perspective for the initiative very gloomy.
The unclear relation of insurgents with religious authorities or leaders makes it very hard to determine whether a peace negotiation through authorities’ mediation would help the security situation to improve. Further, for leaders like Mullah Omar and Hekmatyar, it is in their strategic interest not to come along with the government’s peace proposals. They see the peace proposal by the government and the international society as showing the government and its backers’ frustration rather than giving a signal of good intention towards them. They might even take the proposal as sign of gradual die out of the government and victory for themselves- a perception that was widespread among Jihadi groups throughout1989-92 when the communist regime was pushing for a national reconciliation program, but they rejected and fought till the collapse of Dr. Najeebullah’s government.
It would be unrealistic to say that the current insurgency would lead to a similar break down of the state like the one that communist regime faced because of many differences between the two circumstances such as insurgents’ technical capacity and scope of popular support, but the continuation of insurgency puts the government in a far challenging situation that can consequently lead to a popular frustration and lose of capital for the Afghan state. A double strategy of negotiation and building up of the military capacity to aggressively target insurgents seem to be a temporary option for the Afghan government until changes in the internal circumstances bring up new opportunities. However, a regional anti-insurgency strategy needs to be developed in longer turn to deal with the problem.
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who is the former prime minister to the Islamic State of Afghanistan, and who played a strong role in Jihad against the Soviet Union, joined the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in 2002 after having been fully excluded from the post-Taliban government structure designed at the Bonn conference. Although some believe that Hekmatyar’s insurgents are among the Taliban and have a big role in the insurgency, especially in the areas closer to the capital he seems to have a complicated relation with Taliban. It has not been clear if his men are incorporated into the insurgency movement or are a separate body within it. His recent move to deny the Taliban’s hand in the killing of French soldiers and take its responsibility himself confirms that he preserves his own independent position within the insurgency structure.
Hekmatyar takes responsibility for the attack while the Afghan government is trying to launch a peace negotiation with insurgents through Saudi Arabia’s mediation. The government has been repeatedly asking Hekmatyar and Mullah Omar to put down their arms and join the peace and political process, despite the fact that they are on the CIA black list. But they both have rejected the proposal. Recent reports say that there have been covert talks with Taliban for the past some months, but neither Afghan officials nor the Taliban has admitted it. On 29th of September, Reuters reported that ‘The Taliban leadership on Monday denied a report they were negotiating with the Afghan government to end the war and the insurgents repeated their pledge to keep fighting till foreign troops were expelled from the country’.
Hekmatyar’s act of taking responsibility for attack on French soldiers can be interpreted as re-stating his commitment to the same objective shared by Mullah Omar. Hekmatyar and Mullah Omar’s rejection of peace talks implies that negotiation –though should be encouraged- will not immediately lead to a resolution or significant security improvement in Afghanistan. In order to get a deeper sense of the insurgency and its character we should look at the insurgency in a nuanced way in the sense to see it as comprised of different groups and its structure as fragmented and largely decentralized that is not bound together by a single central authority. In such cases, bringing a leader into the peace process might have very little effect on brining down the insurgency machine.
This situation is presumably realized by insurgency leaders too. It puts the leaders in a position that would make it hard for them to convince sub-insurgent networks in case of negotiation. the insurgents have proved to be tough on leaders who give up their resistance and join the enemy. They have killed many prominent religious authorities who cooperated with the government, and have not followed some senior Taliban authorities who joined the peace process. For some groups within the insurgents accepting peace proposals from a western backed government, which has no legitimacy for them, is almost equal to compromising their faith and ideological commitments. The major challenge in this regard has been that the groups under Mullah Omar and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s leadership have opposed the very legitimacy of an Afghan government. From this position, they have challenged any authority within their groups or outside who have tried to show that there is no problem with the government from the view point of religion.
Last week, President Karzai said to AFP that he had asked Saudi Arabia’s king as the leader of the Muslim world to mediate a peace talk with insurgents in Afghanistan. The success of this initiative seems to be very unlikely too. This is partly due to the decentralized structure of Islam as a social and political system that allows for fragmentation in it in terms of authority. But in regard to militant Islamic groups in particular, this kind of mediation is very unlikely to work out as the insurgents have never come under a central authority like Saudi Arabia’s king. Further, Islamic militants’ perception of Saudi’s king as an ally of the western countries, who has no authority before them, makes the perspective for the initiative very gloomy.
The unclear relation of insurgents with religious authorities or leaders makes it very hard to determine whether a peace negotiation through authorities’ mediation would help the security situation to improve. Further, for leaders like Mullah Omar and Hekmatyar, it is in their strategic interest not to come along with the government’s peace proposals. They see the peace proposal by the government and the international society as showing the government and its backers’ frustration rather than giving a signal of good intention towards them. They might even take the proposal as sign of gradual die out of the government and victory for themselves- a perception that was widespread among Jihadi groups throughout1989-92 when the communist regime was pushing for a national reconciliation program, but they rejected and fought till the collapse of Dr. Najeebullah’s government.
It would be unrealistic to say that the current insurgency would lead to a similar break down of the state like the one that communist regime faced because of many differences between the two circumstances such as insurgents’ technical capacity and scope of popular support, but the continuation of insurgency puts the government in a far challenging situation that can consequently lead to a popular frustration and lose of capital for the Afghan state. A double strategy of negotiation and building up of the military capacity to aggressively target insurgents seem to be a temporary option for the Afghan government until changes in the internal circumstances bring up new opportunities. However, a regional anti-insurgency strategy needs to be developed in longer turn to deal with the problem.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)