In a press conference that was held on the 16th of November in Kabul, President Hamid Karzai expressed his willingness to protect the fugitive Taliban leader, Mullah Omar and some other top Taliban commanders if they are willing to join the Afghan government for the sake of peace[1]. Karzai’s statement signifies the weaknesses of his government and his failure to talk to the insurgents from the position of power. It further shows that there is not any legally established framework of negotiation and reconciliation that identifies terms of reconciliation and that can serve as a reference for peace building in Afghanistan.
There have been a lot of efforts from the government’s side to open up negotiations with the Taliban as an antidote for the current volatile security context in Afghanistan. However, Afghan government’s attempts at peace talks have not met with any success. Taliban have continuously ignored peace gestures from the government and have demanded the withdrawal of foreign troops and the establishment of an Islamic state on the basis of the Sharia law as preconditions for peace negotiation to begin. Taliban’s inflexible stance on the preconditions for peace has led the Afghan government to beg the militancy to come to the table. This has negatively affected the position of the Afghan government in terms of power relation on the issue of peace building.
Peace building and reconciliation among parties that are in conflict with a state should be approached as a careful deliberation of a governance strategy in conflict affected societies. Peace building is a governance initiative in which government seeks to expand it’s authority over the insurgent groups. The government will attempt to sustain political stability in long run with respect to preserving the fundamental values that feeds government's legitimacy and public trust in the political institutions.
In Afghanistan, the peace building and negotiation as a means of governance to bring peace and stability by establishing government's authority over resistant groups through political bargaining is absent. The negotiation efforts from the government’s side are insurgency driven urgent security measures to protect the state’s breakdown. This situation has placed the central government in Afghanistan in the position of initially demanding and ‘begging for peace’ from the insurgents, and this in turn, has led to the empowerment of the discourse of the insurgency. The insurgency has interpreted the government gestures as a signal of victory over a democratic government elected by popular votes.
This situation has materialized due to the absence of a defined set of interests formulated in the form of a peace building and reconciliation strategy by the government. Such a strategy should reflect elements of power of the central authority. The centrality of the state in peace building is central to its legitimacy, and its control over the process of peace building to ensure sustainability of states’ foundations of values and ideals.
The lack of a legal reference for reconciliation and peace building in Afghanistan has also allowed for the emergence of conflicting views and interpretations in regard to reconcilability of certain groups or individuals. In most cases of insurgents’ attack on Afghan government and International organizations, are condemned as the acts by the ‘enemies of Afghanistan’. However, the government has never articulated the definition of meaning of ‘enemies of Afghanistan’. President Karzai's latest statement regarding offering of protection to Mullah Omar if he is willing to make peace presents the scope of the problems associated with such a condition. The boundaries between peace building and recognition of terrorism are not made clear in Afghanistan. Karzai’s statement implies a form of recognition of Taliban[2].
Part of problem in this regard is due to the shortcoming of the Bonn conference that established the current political structure in Afghanistan. The Bonn conference, due to pressures by former Jihadi leaders, failed to propose a peace building framework within which certain measures would apply to peace building and reconciliation conditions with parties and persons involved in war crimes in Afghanistan[3]. The lack of such measures has not only allowed for some former war criminals to enjoy power and position in the government, but has encouraged the idea of involving Taliban in the power structure on the basis of the argument that if former Mujahideen leaders –charged with war crimes- can be part of the power structure why Can’t the Taliban be?
However, the absence of a historical structure for peace building should not necessarily be a legitimate reason for not creating a new framework. Peace building, governance and political stability in longer run are closely interlinked in terms of affecting the political outcomes. The government should try to look at peace building as a process of governance rather than submitting to urgent necessities under pressures. Recognition of demands and wills that are in contrast with the very foundation of peace and human rights, are deadly to the political development and the future of stability in Afghanistan.
The scope of the threat posed by the Taliban is much more limited than it is portrayed by the media. It is the weaknesses of the government as well as the international forces in Afghanistan that have allowed for the spread of the fear of state breakdown or state failure in Afghanistan. The lack of a legitimate legal framework for reconciliation and the absence of a perspective on peace building as a governance strategy to empower state and sustain its core ideals have made the state in Afghanistan more vulnerable to crisis and lose of authority and public trust.
[1] Quqnoos.com, Karzai: 'remove me or leave' over Taliban talks, November 16, 2008, URL: http://quqnoos.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2043&Itemid=48&lang=english
[2] Karzai said if Mullah Omar respects the Afghan constitution and comes to peace he will protect him by all cost. He said “If the international community fails to back his protection of the Taliban’s top brass, they can ‘remove me or leave’ (quqnoos.com)”. Karzai’s statement implies that if he is given a choice to choose between the international society and the Taliban under a peace deal condition, he is ready to support Taliban. This actually counts for the recognition of Taliban by president Karzai.
[3] Astri Suhrke; Kristian Berg Harpviken; Arne Strand (Oct. 2002) After Bonn: Conflictual Peace Building, Reconstructing War-Torn Societies: Afghanistan. Third World Quarterly, Vol. 23/ 5. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=01436597%28200210%2923%3A5%3C875%3AABCPB%3E2.0.CO%3B2-%23
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