In a press conference that was held on the 16th of November in Kabul, President Hamid Karzai expressed his willingness to protect the fugitive Taliban leader, Mullah Omar and some other top Taliban commanders if they are willing to join the Afghan government for the sake of peace[1]. Karzai’s statement signifies the weaknesses of his government and his failure to talk to the insurgents from the position of power. It further shows that there is not any legally established framework of negotiation and reconciliation that identifies terms of reconciliation and that can serve as a reference for peace building in Afghanistan.
There have been a lot of efforts from the government’s side to open up negotiations with the Taliban as an antidote for the current volatile security context in Afghanistan. However, Afghan government’s attempts at peace talks have not met with any success. Taliban have continuously ignored peace gestures from the government and have demanded the withdrawal of foreign troops and the establishment of an Islamic state on the basis of the Sharia law as preconditions for peace negotiation to begin. Taliban’s inflexible stance on the preconditions for peace has led the Afghan government to beg the militancy to come to the table. This has negatively affected the position of the Afghan government in terms of power relation on the issue of peace building.
Peace building and reconciliation among parties that are in conflict with a state should be approached as a careful deliberation of a governance strategy in conflict affected societies. Peace building is a governance initiative in which government seeks to expand it’s authority over the insurgent groups. The government will attempt to sustain political stability in long run with respect to preserving the fundamental values that feeds government's legitimacy and public trust in the political institutions.
In Afghanistan, the peace building and negotiation as a means of governance to bring peace and stability by establishing government's authority over resistant groups through political bargaining is absent. The negotiation efforts from the government’s side are insurgency driven urgent security measures to protect the state’s breakdown. This situation has placed the central government in Afghanistan in the position of initially demanding and ‘begging for peace’ from the insurgents, and this in turn, has led to the empowerment of the discourse of the insurgency. The insurgency has interpreted the government gestures as a signal of victory over a democratic government elected by popular votes.
This situation has materialized due to the absence of a defined set of interests formulated in the form of a peace building and reconciliation strategy by the government. Such a strategy should reflect elements of power of the central authority. The centrality of the state in peace building is central to its legitimacy, and its control over the process of peace building to ensure sustainability of states’ foundations of values and ideals.
The lack of a legal reference for reconciliation and peace building in Afghanistan has also allowed for the emergence of conflicting views and interpretations in regard to reconcilability of certain groups or individuals. In most cases of insurgents’ attack on Afghan government and International organizations, are condemned as the acts by the ‘enemies of Afghanistan’. However, the government has never articulated the definition of meaning of ‘enemies of Afghanistan’. President Karzai's latest statement regarding offering of protection to Mullah Omar if he is willing to make peace presents the scope of the problems associated with such a condition. The boundaries between peace building and recognition of terrorism are not made clear in Afghanistan. Karzai’s statement implies a form of recognition of Taliban[2].
Part of problem in this regard is due to the shortcoming of the Bonn conference that established the current political structure in Afghanistan. The Bonn conference, due to pressures by former Jihadi leaders, failed to propose a peace building framework within which certain measures would apply to peace building and reconciliation conditions with parties and persons involved in war crimes in Afghanistan[3]. The lack of such measures has not only allowed for some former war criminals to enjoy power and position in the government, but has encouraged the idea of involving Taliban in the power structure on the basis of the argument that if former Mujahideen leaders –charged with war crimes- can be part of the power structure why Can’t the Taliban be?
However, the absence of a historical structure for peace building should not necessarily be a legitimate reason for not creating a new framework. Peace building, governance and political stability in longer run are closely interlinked in terms of affecting the political outcomes. The government should try to look at peace building as a process of governance rather than submitting to urgent necessities under pressures. Recognition of demands and wills that are in contrast with the very foundation of peace and human rights, are deadly to the political development and the future of stability in Afghanistan.
The scope of the threat posed by the Taliban is much more limited than it is portrayed by the media. It is the weaknesses of the government as well as the international forces in Afghanistan that have allowed for the spread of the fear of state breakdown or state failure in Afghanistan. The lack of a legitimate legal framework for reconciliation and the absence of a perspective on peace building as a governance strategy to empower state and sustain its core ideals have made the state in Afghanistan more vulnerable to crisis and lose of authority and public trust.
[1] Quqnoos.com, Karzai: 'remove me or leave' over Taliban talks, November 16, 2008, URL: http://quqnoos.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2043&Itemid=48&lang=english
[2] Karzai said if Mullah Omar respects the Afghan constitution and comes to peace he will protect him by all cost. He said “If the international community fails to back his protection of the Taliban’s top brass, they can ‘remove me or leave’ (quqnoos.com)”. Karzai’s statement implies that if he is given a choice to choose between the international society and the Taliban under a peace deal condition, he is ready to support Taliban. This actually counts for the recognition of Taliban by president Karzai.
[3] Astri Suhrke; Kristian Berg Harpviken; Arne Strand (Oct. 2002) After Bonn: Conflictual Peace Building, Reconstructing War-Torn Societies: Afghanistan. Third World Quarterly, Vol. 23/ 5. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=01436597%28200210%2923%3A5%3C875%3AABCPB%3E2.0.CO%3B2-%23
Monday, November 24, 2008
Monday, November 3, 2008
Attack at the Ministry of Culture to Challenge Ongoing Peace Efforts
Last week’s[1] suicide attack at the Ministry of Information and Culture in Kabul by the Taliban raises serious questions about the capabilities of the national security forces to prevent such attacks on government institutions. Four people were killed as a result of this strike[2]. The attack coincided with the hosting of an Afghan-Pakistani mini-jirga (jirgagai) in Islamabad aimed at finding solutions to the current situation. This jirgagai concluded that the governments of both Afghanistan and Pakistan should engage in dialogue with the insurgency, and that a ‘convening’ committee should be created to facilitate communication with anti-governmental forces in order to achieve a peaceful resolution to the ongoing conflict. The Ministry of Information attack was a blatant message to the Jirga participants that insurgents pay no heed to these ongoing peace-building efforts.
The attack has struck fear among civil servants working for government offices as well as among ordinary citizens in the capital. The suicide bomber in this instance entered the ministry, shooting his way through to the media hall where he blew himself up. Concerns have arisen due to the Taliban’s ability in this case to breach the defenses of a city-central and protected government building. These concerns have led to calls to re-assess the Taliban’s capability. The Information Ministry attack underscores the enormous scope of the challenge faced by the Afghan government with regard to providing daily security for government employees and the rest of the citizenry alike.
The phenomenon of the suicide attack in Afghanistan is a relatively new tactic of militants, having emerged since the fall of the Taliban regime. Since 2001-2002, which recorded two attacks total, suicide attack numbers have increased exponentially to 21 such incidents in 2005, and reached their highest peak in 2007 with 143 recorded incidents. With last week’s attack, the number of suicide attacks this year has reached 100. Although the figure for this year shows a drop in the number of attacks compared to last year, the threat remains, and the year is not yet out.
Despite widespread condemnation of suicide attacks by religious authorities in Afghanistan, militants continue to use suicide attacks on the Afghan government and the international forces. Last week’s suicide attack was particularly significant because the target’s location in the heart of the city. The Ministry of Information and Culture is located in one of the most crowded areas of the city and is protected by security guards. The ministry building is attached to the Ministry of Communication and the Spinzar Hotel. It is a mere hundred yards away from the presidential palace. The attack could have brought down this entire block and would have caused a far greater number of casualties had the explosives been stronger.
Moreover, last week’s attack took place despite recent international attempts to stem the tide of violence in the country through negotiation with insurgent groups. The Information Ministry attack substantiates the widely held belief that while a peace negotiation should be encouraged; it will do very little in the short-term to bring down the threats of insurgency and terrorism in the country.
The Taliban took responsibility for the Ministry of Information attack immediately after it took place. This conveyed a clear message to the parties involved in the negotiation efforts that their peace building strategy may come to naught, and that they should reassess their efforts and re-think about ways to fight insurgency in Afghanistan.
Despite the fact that the Taliban are at the center of the insurgency movement in Afghanistan, the sweep of the insurgency is much broader than the Taliban leadership alone, and the associated terrorist organizations that emerged within the insurgency structure make up a significant network of ideological and political influence over the Taliban insurgency at different levels.
It is very doubtful that a peace deal with the Taliban leadership will significantly lower the threat from insurgency. This means that terrorism will continue to frustrate the Afghans even if the Taliban leadership enters into a peace deal with the central government. Of course, the attack on the Ministry of Information and Culture conveyed a clear message that the Taliban are also not eager to join a peace agreement. The peace effort actors need to guard themselves against placing too much stead in the outcome of the peace negotiations. The peace efforts should be accompanied by extensive use of military means to tackle the insurgency at current situation.
[1] Suicide attack at the Ministry of Information and Culture of Afghanistan, Deh Afghanan, Kabul, October 30, 2008.
[2] Laura King, Los Angeles Times, October 30, 2008.
The attack has struck fear among civil servants working for government offices as well as among ordinary citizens in the capital. The suicide bomber in this instance entered the ministry, shooting his way through to the media hall where he blew himself up. Concerns have arisen due to the Taliban’s ability in this case to breach the defenses of a city-central and protected government building. These concerns have led to calls to re-assess the Taliban’s capability. The Information Ministry attack underscores the enormous scope of the challenge faced by the Afghan government with regard to providing daily security for government employees and the rest of the citizenry alike.
The phenomenon of the suicide attack in Afghanistan is a relatively new tactic of militants, having emerged since the fall of the Taliban regime. Since 2001-2002, which recorded two attacks total, suicide attack numbers have increased exponentially to 21 such incidents in 2005, and reached their highest peak in 2007 with 143 recorded incidents. With last week’s attack, the number of suicide attacks this year has reached 100. Although the figure for this year shows a drop in the number of attacks compared to last year, the threat remains, and the year is not yet out.
Despite widespread condemnation of suicide attacks by religious authorities in Afghanistan, militants continue to use suicide attacks on the Afghan government and the international forces. Last week’s suicide attack was particularly significant because the target’s location in the heart of the city. The Ministry of Information and Culture is located in one of the most crowded areas of the city and is protected by security guards. The ministry building is attached to the Ministry of Communication and the Spinzar Hotel. It is a mere hundred yards away from the presidential palace. The attack could have brought down this entire block and would have caused a far greater number of casualties had the explosives been stronger.
Moreover, last week’s attack took place despite recent international attempts to stem the tide of violence in the country through negotiation with insurgent groups. The Information Ministry attack substantiates the widely held belief that while a peace negotiation should be encouraged; it will do very little in the short-term to bring down the threats of insurgency and terrorism in the country.
The Taliban took responsibility for the Ministry of Information attack immediately after it took place. This conveyed a clear message to the parties involved in the negotiation efforts that their peace building strategy may come to naught, and that they should reassess their efforts and re-think about ways to fight insurgency in Afghanistan.
Despite the fact that the Taliban are at the center of the insurgency movement in Afghanistan, the sweep of the insurgency is much broader than the Taliban leadership alone, and the associated terrorist organizations that emerged within the insurgency structure make up a significant network of ideological and political influence over the Taliban insurgency at different levels.
It is very doubtful that a peace deal with the Taliban leadership will significantly lower the threat from insurgency. This means that terrorism will continue to frustrate the Afghans even if the Taliban leadership enters into a peace deal with the central government. Of course, the attack on the Ministry of Information and Culture conveyed a clear message that the Taliban are also not eager to join a peace agreement. The peace effort actors need to guard themselves against placing too much stead in the outcome of the peace negotiations. The peace efforts should be accompanied by extensive use of military means to tackle the insurgency at current situation.
[1] Suicide attack at the Ministry of Information and Culture of Afghanistan, Deh Afghanan, Kabul, October 30, 2008.
[2] Laura King, Los Angeles Times, October 30, 2008.
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